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This article argues that the Lega Nord is best understood, first and foremost, as a regionalist 
populist party. Following a brief discussion of the importance of the territorial reference in explain-
ing the Lega, the article examines its populist discourse using material from the party’s newspaper
La Padania over the three days in June 2005 around the annual Lega rally in Pontida.
Introduction
Like the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) (examined by Daniele Albertazzi in this issue), the
Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy has built its success over the last 20 years on
a regionalist populist critique of the state and its political class. As Cas Mudde has
discussed, however, there is a descriptive and interpretative babel around what he
classifies as ‘the extreme right party family’ and the Lega Nord has been variously
defined and categorised (Mudde, 1996). For example, the Lega is included by
Andrej Zaslove in his list of ‘radical right’ parties (Zaslove, 2004), by Jens Rydgren
among the ‘extreme right-wing populists’ (Rydgren, 2005) and by Alfio Mas-
tropaolo among the many ‘antipolitical’ new forces on the right (Mastropaolo,
2005). Most recently, Pippa Norris acknowledges the ambiguity of the Lega Nord,
but nonetheless deals with both it and the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) under the
umbrella term of ‘radical right’ (Norris, 2005).
There is not the space here for a lengthy discussion of definitional problems and
solutions, so I will adopt the recent approach of Anthony J. McGann and Herbert
Kitschelt who, in considering the Freiheitspartei Österreichs (FPÖ, Austrian
Freedom party) and Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP, Swiss People’s party) focus
on ‘whether various concepts are descriptively useful’ and conclude that ‘new
radical-right’ suits those parties best (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005, p. 148). Fol-
lowing that logic, I believe that the most descriptively useful term for the Lega
remains that of ‘regionalist populist’, as used by Roberto Biorcio (1991). Simply
put, it is impossible to understand and explain the Lega from its foundation to the
present day without explicitly highlighting the party’s ‘regionalist’ character. The
Lega Nord arose in a specific political and socio-economic environment and its elab-
oration of themes is still developed, first and foremost, with reference to the ter-
ritorial context of its heartland (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). The party frames
the problems of the north as a centre-periphery question within a ‘people’ v. ‘the
elite’ populist discourse. The ‘radical right’ label and the others listed above thus
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diminish this crucial territorial aspect of the Lega and its history as a movement
constantly committed to some form of northern autonomy (whether federalism,
independence or, since 2000, ‘la devolution’), seen as an essential part of the solu-
tion to the problems of northern Italy (Diamanti, 1996).
The second key element of the Lega is its populism. Again, there is not the space
for a detailed discussion of the elusiveness of that term. However, if we focus on
discourse, we can use a definition which, like populism itself, is flexible and can
accommodate a wide range of populist movements. For the purposes of this article,
therefore, populism is considered as, above all else, a discourse which pits a virtu-
ous, homogeneous people against a set of self-serving ‘poteri forti’ (‘powers-
that-be’), as the Lega Nord describes them. These poteri forti are depicted as 
conspiring, in a time of (perceived or real) crisis and change, not only to deprive
the people of what is rightfully theirs in terms of their economic and social stand-
ing, but to suppress their values, their voice and their very identity. This view
echoes that of Mudde who says populism ‘considers society to be ultimately sepa-
rated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus
“the corrupt elite” ’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).
In order to test the ‘populism’ of the Lega, I will focus on the party over the three
days around its annual rally in Pontida, held on Sunday 19 June 2005. Pontida is
the ‘cathedral’ of the Lega, where celebrations are held and changes in strategy
decided, with the ‘sacredness’ of the place in Leghista rhetoric conferring legitimacy
on them (Biorcio, 1997, p. 198). To avoid being conditioned by the hostile filters
employed by much of the Italian media when dealing with the party, what follows
is based solely on material from its official newspaper La Padania. This publication
is funded by the Lega and its editors are chosen (and dismissed at will) by the lead-
ership. It seems legitimate therefore to take its reporting of the Pontida weekend
as faithful to the party line. Our conclusion is that the Lega Nord represents a clear
example of a movement that is best viewed as, first and foremost, regionalist 
populist.
The Lega Nord in its own words
The people and the Lega
Consistent with Paul Taggart’s observation that in the populist imagination of the
heartland there resides ‘a virtuous and unified population’ (Taggart, 2000, p. 95),
since its inception, the Lega Nord has used a framework of interpretation in which
a positively evaluated ‘us’ or ‘the people’ – honest, hard-working and simple-living
northern Italians attached to their local traditions – is posited as prey to a series of
dangers orchestrated by the powerful enemies of ‘them’ or the ‘poteri forti’. The
identity of these poteri forti may shift over time with the ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of
the people even interchanging (e.g. Berlusconi, the EU etc.), but what does not
change is the juxtaposition in Lega discourse of a corrupt, self-interested elite with
an ‘under-threat’ people whose interests, values, security and identity can only be
safeguarded by the actions of the party and the superior vision and wisdom of its
leader, Umberto Bossi. In this discourse, the people are characterised in three main
interconnected ways, all of which involve threats or betrayal: (1) the people as a
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class – with small northern family enterprises economically under threat from big
business and globalisation; (2) the people as a nation – the homogeneous identity
and culture of which is threatened by a series of ‘others’; (3) the people as sover-
eign – betrayed by the corrupt, liberal, conspiring elites in Rome and Brussels
(Mény and Surel, 2004, p. 257).
The Lega and Bossi stand alone with the people against its many enemies. As Bossi
says in his autobiography: ‘I feel that there is good where the people is. Evil nests
in the corridors of power’ (Bossi and Vimercati, 1992, p. 187). Not only is the Lega
‘of the people’ and ‘with the people’, but the party and its leader are cast as the
very incarnation of the people. As the MEP Mario Borghezio declared at the
Pontida rally, ‘the Lega is the people, Bossi is the people’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005,
p. 4). Eschewing the obtuse language of professional politicians, the Lega ‘tells
uncomfortable truths’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005, p. 5), according to the Leghista
Minister for Justice, Roberto Castelli. The Lega MP Luigi Peruzzotti asserts that 
the party ‘is the only political force which speaks the language of the people’ 
(La Padania, 20 June, p. 7).
Having been in government since 2001, however, the Lega has to show its sup-
porters that association with the trappings of power in Rome has not tainted it and
that it is still ‘of the people’. The party’s ministers thus portray themselves as ‘reluc-
tant politicians’ (Taggart, 2000, p. 61), who would much rather be at home in the
provincial north than among the despised ‘professional politicians’ in the capital.
When asked how he likes life in Rome, the Lega Minister for Welfare, Roberto
Maroni, replies that it is something which has always irritated him, ‘because Rome
is the home of politics conducted in corridors, in the drawing rooms of the elite:
it is the hushed politics of hidden plots. Pontida is the exact opposite: it is the
revenge of the ordinary people’ (La Padania, 19 June 2005, p. 6). As we have
argued elsewhere, the Lega of government thus has to be seen to remain a ‘fight-
ing Lega’, battling against the corrupt professional political class in Rome and
Europe (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005).
The enemies of the people
As Mudde says, ‘populism presents a Manichean outlook, in which there are only
friends and foes. Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values,
they are evil!’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). The people and the Lega have enemies, not
opponents. However, as mentioned earlier, the enemies of the people in Lega dis-
course have changed over time. For example, for much of the 1990s, the Lega
claimed that the corruption and backwardness of ‘Rome’ and the south of Italy
were imperilling northern participation in European integration and European
Monetary Union (EMU) and that, should Italy fail to meet the criteria for EMU,
the north (Padania) would have to declare independence. Although, like region-
alist parties such as Plaid Cymru (Hoppe, 2005), the Lega supported an eventual
‘Europe of the regions’, the EU and the integration process were characterised as
providing a lifeline for northern Italy against state centralism and inefficiency. Fol-
lowing the Prodi government’s successful negotiation of Italian acceptance into
EMU in 1998, however, the Lega moved swiftly towards a position which, irre-
spective of the differences between the two definitions, fulfils the criteria both for
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what Kopecky and Mudde term ‘Eurorejectionism’ and Szczerbiak and Taggart
‘Hard Euroscepticism’ (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003).
The Lega now not only rejects EMU, further integration and enlargement, but
would repeal many of the powers (e.g. in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar)
which have been devolved to an ‘undemocratic’ and ‘corrupt’ Brussels.
This anti-European position is expressed through the populist discourse of 
‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. Interviewed in La Padania, the Minister for Reform,
Roberto Calderoli, announced the launch of ‘the Lega’s crusade against the Euro
and the European superstate’, adding that Europe may have ‘taken away the
people’s identity, currency, and sovereignty, but not their common sense’ (La
Padania, 18 June 2005, p. 6). Calderoli’s colleagues are all similarly ‘on message’.
Despite the party’s favourable position on EMU prior to entry, Maroni now blames
Prodi, who ‘fixed Italy’s entry into the Euro at the wrong time and in the wrong
way’ (La Padania, 19 June 2005, p. 8). On the same day, Francesca Morandi writes
that ‘the Lega has battled against the European superstate, against an elitist and
centralist Europe made up of financial and political lobbies’ (La Padania, 19 June
2005, p. 5). Similarly, Castelli warns that ‘the poteri forti, high finance, major indus-
try, and the press will not give up on this project lightly’ (La Padania, 19 June 2005,
p. 7). More crudely, Borghezio refers to the ‘lobbyists in Brussels, this criminal
band, these hidden powers, these gnomes of high finance who control the strings
of power as if the peoples of Europe were just puppets’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005,
p. 4).
Another ‘enemy’ of the people, which has gained in prominence since the party
toned down its ‘anti-southern Italian’ rhetoric (upon its return to the centre-right
alliance in 2000) and, in particular, following September 11th, is Islam and immi-
grants of that faith. The Lega’s position on immigration tallies with what Hans-
Georg Betz and Carol Johnson describe as ‘selective exclusion’, according to which
‘certain groups cannot be integrated into society and therefore represent a funda-
mental threat to the values, way of life and cultural integrity of the “indigenous”
people’ (Betz and Johnson, 2004, p. 318). We can see this position clearly in an
article by the Lega former junior minister, Stefano Stefani, who stresses that the
party’s opposition to immigration is not based, ‘as our opponents speciously claim,
on blind xenophobia, but on the self-evident fear that it will soon be “too late” ’
(La Padania, 18 June 2005, pp. 1–2). Stefani argues that ‘not all immigration is the
same, not all those who want to enter the country are equal’ and proposes there-
fore that Italy should instead encourage and facilitate the return of those of Italian
descent in South America with whom there are ‘common cultural, historical and
religious roots’.
The Lega’s position on immigration is characterised by welfare chauvinism and
denials of biologically based racism while espousing the type of ‘cultural racism’ or
‘ethnopluralism’ formulated by the Nouvelle Droite (Rydgren, 2005, p. 427). As Bossi
says: ‘the blackest of the black should have the same rights as my next-door neigh-
bour. But in his own home’ (Bossi and Vimercati, 1998, p. 14). In the pages of La
Padania, the associations made with ‘immigration’ revolve exclusively around
crime, fear, incompatibility and a situation that is out of control. For example, all
the reports in the cronaca (news) section on 19 June 2005 deal with crimes sup-
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posedly committed by immigrants. In the same edition, the federal president of the
party, Angelo Alessandri, talks of the need to defend northern identity against
‘Muslims and all those who want to suffocate us’ (La Padania, 19 June 2005, p. 2).
Displaying the populist unease with the principle of minority rights (discussed by
Albertazzi, 2006), Castelli refers in his Pontida speech to ‘a world in which if you
are a foreigner and an illegal immigrant, you have all the rights. However, if you
are born on your own soil, you have only obligations, you are more a subject than
a citizen’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005, p. 4). The ‘people’ are thus portrayed as
victims of the value systems of the politically correct elite. Like the LDT, the Lega
does not advocate a neoliberal vision of a truncated welfare system so much as a
regionalised one where services reflect local tax revenues and priority and the full
range of benefits are available only to ‘natives’.
The leader
The Pontida rally also marked the official return, after a long illness, of the Lega
leader Umberto Bossi. Pontida therefore represented an opportunity for the party
and the people not only to reaffirm their dedication to one another but, crucially,
to Bossi. The cornerstone of Bossi’s relationship to his people/heartland is that,
while remaining one of them, his unique qualities mean that he is their only pos-
sible saviour. As Max Weber says, whether or not the charismatic leader really pos-
sesses the qualities he claims is not so relevant; the important factor is that his
‘followers’ are convinced that he is their ‘man of destiny’ (Weber, 1995, p. 238).
In the case of Bossi, the grass-roots of the Lega accept his decisions because, in
addition to looking and sounding like them, he is held to possess extraordinary
personal qualities and a fiuto politico (political sixth sense) which put his actions and
U-turns beyond reproach.
During the days around Pontida, the senior members of the party all emphasised
Bossi’s role within the movement. Roberto Cota, secretary of the Lega Nord Pied-
mont, says ‘let us not forget that Bossi is the true interpreter of the mood of the
Lega Nord’ (La Padania, 19 June 2005, p. 6). The secretary of the Lega Nord in
Veneto, Gian Paolo Gobbo, talks of the ‘far-sightedness of Umberto Bossi, who has
always had the ability to see things long before everyone else’ (La Padania, 18 June
2005, p. 7). Bossi was regularly referred to in the paper over the weekend simply 
as the capo (leader) and even the guerriero (warrior). As Margaret Canovan says,
‘populist politics is not ordinary, routine politics. It has the revivalist flavour of 
a movement’ and ‘associated with this mood is the tendency for heightened 
emotions to be framed on a charismatic leader’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 6). Indeed,
Yannis Stavrakakis hypothesises ‘that it might be necessary to distinguish populism
not only in terms of its discursive structure but also in terms of its intensity, the
nature of the investment leaders and followers exhibit in their identifications’
(Stavrakakis, 2004, p. 264). We can see this intensity in Bossi’s appearance at
Pontida. Introducing him, Daniele Belotti (a regional councillor) tells the crowd:
‘he is our guide, our hope of freedom, our hero, our leader’ (La Padania, 20 June
2005, p. 3). Igor Iezzi writes that the crowd can feel the atmosphere of ‘a page in
history being written. The hundred thousand have tears in their eyes’ (La Padania,
20 June 2005, p. 3). In the same edition, we read that Pontida is a day of coming
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together for those who ‘have bound themselves irrevocably by oath to their move-
ment and their great leader’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005, p. 14). This devotion and
faith is clear in the comments by a member of the crowd who says that Pontida is
an occasion when, ‘thanks to the essential instructions of the Leader, we can under-
stand what is really going on behind the scenes in politics and how the movement’s
strategy will develop as a result’ (La Padania, 20 June 2005, p. 13).
Conclusion
As Taggart says, ‘populism is always partially constituted by aspects of the envi-
ronment in which it finds itself’ (Taggart, 2000, p. 4). As that environment changes,
as different niches expand and contract, populists have to reformulate their focus
on different issues. There is a structure and agency interplay here: when populists
contribute to profoundly changing the structure around them as the Lega did 
in the 1990s, they then have to re-establish themselves in opposition to new 
political realities and reassert their position as the sole defender of the threatened/
betrayed people. This carries the risk of an inflationary spiral in which the populist
party goes too far and we can perhaps see this in the Lega’s secessionist phase in
the second half of the 1990s.
Despite the changes in the Lega’s list of friends, enemies, themes and aims over
the last two decades, however, two main elements have remained at the forefront:
its regionalist and populist character. As Marco Tarchi argues, the Lega can change
its political alliances and enemies, condemn those whom it had previously praised
and vice versa, ‘but what it can not allow itself to do is to abandon the style, men-
tality, jargon and rhetorical registers of populism’ (Tarchi, 2003, pp. 154–155). 
Similarly, it cannot afford to dilute its commitment to its territorial heartland by
attempting to appeal to areas beyond it. Beyond this, however, the Lega has a great
deal of flexibility. It can flirt with both left and right and make U-turns justified by
the vision of ‘the far-seeing leader’ and the argument that ‘all we have ever wanted
is more autonomy for our people. Everything else is secondary’. Indeed, in a recent
interview with this author and Daniele Albertazzi, the Lega MP and former min-
ister Giancarlo Pagliarini speculated that the party could even support a centre-left
administration after the 2006 elections in return for further decentralisation
reforms.1 Having walked the populist tightrope of government participation for
four years without slipping and having even seen its vote rise while that of its coali-
tion partners has fallen (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005), the Lega might just con-
tinue defying those for whom the fate of such populists ‘is to be integrated into
the mainstream, to disappear, or to remain permanently in opposition’ (Mény and
Surel, 2001, p. 18).
Note
1 Interview with Giancarlo Pagliarini conducted in Chiavari on 1 November 2005.
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